But they are lulled into complacency by the fact that they just "fixed" the problem. For a while, everything looks Ok, until the "A/C" problem recurs (pax complain that it is cold in the cabin?). phase 2: now they are climbing with an incorrectly configured airplane. Both were non native English speakers and any noise source would probably affect them more. To make matters worse, they may have disabled some of the aural warnings (cabin altitude cut out switch?) while troubleshooting the problem. To support this scenario, one would have to imagine an incorrect fix for a misdiagnosed problem that at 16,000ft looks like a valid solution (what specific actions?). Let us assume that during phase 1 they jointly misdiagnosed the problem (if they had not, they would never have decided to climb later) and agreed on a fix. Later he indicates that "we have solved the problem" and can now climb to cruise altitude. phase 1: at 16,000ft, the pilot reports A/C problem to ATC. May be someone could formulate a plausible technical scenario by breaking the problem into two phases and filling in some technical gaps, particularly in phase 1, using some of the explanations proposed in earlier messages. An extraordinary set of circumstances has to have happened leading to the outcome we know or more likely, a compound set of events where the initial events set the stage for the latter, more critical ones. ![]() ![]() ![]() In the mean time, it is fascinating to read how baffling this case is to experts. But the passenger oxygen one could have worked perfectly but if the captain thought that maybe it was controlled by a possibly faulty cabin pressure controller he might have gone back to investigate or just reassure the passengers.Ĭlearly, the space for speculation should quickly shrink provided the French authorities decide to share some of the results of the FDR soon. The reason I say this is that on the 737 the 'alt warning' comes from a pretty crappy switch in the fwd electronics bay and it is certainly not unheard of for these to fail to operate correctly. The captain may have then thought the aircraft must be ok because we haven't had a 'cabin alt' warning so goes back to speak to the passengers just to reassure them leaving a flight attendant and first officer in the flight deck but the aircraft continues to depressurise then people start to surcome to hypoxia including one captain and his crew who are not on oxygen because he doesn't think there is a problem with the aircraft anymore and we know the rest from here. The problem could of then come up when the flightcrew could of got a master caution along with the overhead light and looked up to see that the 'pass oxy on' light was illuminated. I think what could of happened is that the aircraft had the pressurisation problem that we know about but then thought they had fixed it so climbed to altitude. What have the Investigation Authorities located in the search. Anyone confirmĪt work this is a very Puzzling Accident discussion. I realise the accident a/c wasn't a 200 series a/c but I expect the Pressurisation logic would be similar. Not before giving the Crew adequate warning. If it goes to full open at altitude,it could get the cabin pressure to ambient in seconds. Preflight checks on Qty gauge & O2 Bottles mandatory.Difficult to believe all were INOP.Īnd that points a finger towards a runaway outflow valve. If the reports are true of the f/o being slumpled over the control column, that might have caused it to lose its vertical modeĭepends on the pressure load aplied to the Force TxDcr to disconnect A/P.Įither from a previous incident where it was not turned off and leaked down, recharged and not connected correctly valve left close or open whatever the case maybe or even worse plane was dispatched with empty or low O2 bottle
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